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Abstract
We describe an alternative interpretation of the AGM postulates for belief change (Alchourrón et
al., 1985; Gärdenfors, 1988) in a foundational framework of epistemic states suggested by Bochman
(1997). Though foundational contractions constitute a new kind of belief contractions, incompatible
with AGM postulates, a broad class of preferential AGM contractions is shown to be revision-
equivalent to foundational contractions and can actually be produced using a modification of the
contraction operation on epistemic states. It is shown also that revisions of epistemic states determine
a natural class of preferential AGM revisions, and that all the AGM postulates for revision can
be satisfied by imposing reasonable restrictions on underlying epistemic states. As a result, the
foundational theory of epistemic states is shown to provide a unification of the main approaches
to belief change on a foundationalist basis. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The AGM theory of belief revision [1,9] can be seen as a true starting point in the study
of belief change. It has suggested a systematic approach to the problem both in terms of
general rationality postulates a belief change should satisfy and in describing semantic
representations that conform to these postulates. According to the AGM theory, belief
change is a process of revising (deductively closed) belief sets based on some selection
function choosing among their maximal subsets that are consistent with the new data.
The theory is usually considered as an instantiation of a coherentist approach to belief
acceptance (see [10]), according to which justifications, or reasons, of our beliefs should
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not be taken into account in performing belief change. An alternative, more foundational,
approach has been suggested by a number of authors (see, e.g., [7,13,20]). According to the
latter, the corpus of beliefs is seen as generated by some (usually finite) set of propositions
called its base. Changes of such base-generated belief sets are determined by changes
in their underlying bases. Among other virtues, this approach has definite computational
advantages and allows also to avoid some controversial features of the AGM theory, such
as the famous postulate of recovery.
In this paper we will describe an alternative representation of the AGM theory in
the general foundational framework of epistemic states suggested in [3]. To begin with,
we describe belief change functions generated by contraction, expansion and revision
operations on epistemic states, and compare them with corresponding AGM operations
on belief sets. Then we will show how the AGM rationality postulates for contraction
and revision can be interpreted in this foundational framework using certain plausible
operations on epistemic states.
2. Epistemic states
The approach suggested in [3] is based on the notion of an epistemic state, given below.
As is argued in [3], this notion can be seen as a natural output of the representation of belief
suggested in current theories of nonmonotonic reasoning.
Definition 2.1. An epistemic state E is a set of deductively closed theories. 1 Each u ∈ E
is called an admissible belief state of E .
Admissible belief states represent potential belief sets that are actually envisaged by the
agent; they correspond to what is considered by the agent as serious possibilities. The very
restriction on such possibilities indicates that actual and potential beliefs are correlated.
As is shown in [3], epistemic states can be described in terms of dependence relations
holding between propositions. Such dependence relations reflect, in particular, justification
relations among potential beliefs. In this way the framework of epistemic states allows us
to represent a general foundationalist approach to belief change.
An epistemic state presupposes the following notion of belief acceptance:
Definition 2.2. A proposition is believed in an epistemic state E if it belongs to all maximal
belief states from E . The set of all propositions believed in E is called a belief set of E .
Epistemic states considered below will always form a continuous partial order with
respect to set inclusion: the union of any chain of belief states from E will also belong to
E . This will guarantee, in particular, correctness of the above definition, since any such
epistemic state will have maximal belief states.
As a matter of fact, the AGM theory also presupposes the above criterion of belief
acceptance with respect to propositions that ‘survive’ a change. Thus, a proposition will
1 That is, sets of propositions closed under classical consequence relation.
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belong to a contracted belief state according to AGM if it belongs to all (selected) maximal
subtheories of the initial state that do not include the proposition being contracted. On our
approach, this is how we should accept our beliefs from the very beginning.
Belief change operations are defined in [3] as functions from epistemic states to
epistemic states. As an important ‘by-product’, they produce changes in their associated
belief sets. In other words, changes of an epistemic state generate corresponding belief
change functions on its belief sets. Such belief change functions will be the main subject
of the present study.
2.1. Consequence relations as representations of epistemic states
In [3] a syntactic description of epistemic states was given in the framework of a
general sequent calculus called Scott consequence relations. Scott consequence relation is
a ‘symmetric’ generalization of Tarski consequence relation that involves rules of the form
a ` b, where a and b are sets of propositions. It was shown that the ‘multiple-conclusion’
character of Scott sequents is essential for providing an adequate representation of iterated
and multiple belief change operations on epistemic states. Still, it was demonstrated also
that for ‘one-step’ changes or, more exactly, for determining belief change functions
associated with an epistemic state, we can safely restrict the formalism to ordinary Tarski
consequence relations. Since belief change functions constitute the main concern of the
AGM theory, this simplifying representation will be helpful in establishing the relationship
between our framework and the AGM approach.
In what follows we will denote propositions by A,B, . . . and finite sets of propositions
by a, b, . . . .
A Tarski consequence relation is characterized by the following conditions:
(Reflexivity) A`A;
(Monotonicity) If a `A, then a,B `A, for any proposition B;
(Cut) If a `A and a,A ` B , then a ` B .
We consider below Tarski consequence relations in a language containing the usual
classical connectives {∨,∧,¬,→}.  will denote the classical entailment with respect to
these connectives.
A Tarski consequence relation is called supraclassical if it satisfies the following
condition:
(Supraclassicality) If a  A, then a `A.
Thus, a Tarski consequence relation is supraclassical if it subsumes classical inference.
As can be easily shown, supraclassicality requires all theories of a consequence relation to
be deductively closed sets. On the syntactic side, supraclassicality allows for replacement
of logically equivalent propositions in premises and conclusions of the rules. It allows
also to replace a set of premises by their conjunction: a ` A will always be equivalent to∧
a `A. This implies, in particular, that a supraclassical consequence relation can also be
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viewed as a certain binary relation among classical propositions. We will often use this
fact implicitly in what follows.
A Tarski consequence relation will be called classical if it is supraclassical and satisfies
the deduction theorem: a,A ` B always implies a ` A→ B . Such consequence relations
are commonly used in the literature on belief change for describing the underlying logic.
Classical entailment  coincides with the least classical consequence relation. In what
follows, Th will denote a provability operator of some classical Tarski consequence
relation, while Thc will denote the provability operator corresponding to the classical
entailment.
For any supraclassical consequence relation ` there exists a greatest classical conse-
quence relation included in it. We will denote the latter by Th` and call it the classical
subrelation of `. It is defined as follows:
A ∈ Th`(a) ≡ `
∧
a→A.
The classical subrelation of a consequence relation will determine the ‘internal logic’ of
the corresponding epistemic state and associated belief change functions.
Now, any epistemic state E generates a supraclassical Tarski consequence relation `E
defined as follows:
a `E A ≡ For any u ∈ E , if a ⊆ u, then A ∈ u.
Accordingly, supraclassical consequence relations can be used as a formalism providing
a syntactic representation of epistemic states. The consequence relation associated with
an epistemic state can be seen as expressing basic dependence relations holding between
our beliefs. On this understanding, A ` B can also be interpreted as saying “Belief in A
depends on belief in B”.
Remark. Notice that the direction of dependence is usually opposite to that of inference;
if we accept A as our new belief, and A is our only ground for acceptingA∨B , thenA∨B
depends on A in our epistemic state, and hence A ∨ B ` A will belong to the associated
consequence relation.
In view of the correspondence between epistemic states and consequence relations,
all the notions definable for epistemic states can be translated into the terminology of
consequence relations. In particular, we introduce the following
Definition 2.3. A proposition A will be said to be believed in a consequence relation `, if
it belongs to all maximal consistent theories of `. The set of all believed propositions will
be called a belief set of ` and denoted by K`.
Notice that according to the above definition, the belief set K` is always consistent. In
what follows, we will write a ` as a shorthand for a `⊥, where ⊥ is an arbitrary classical
contradiction. The following lemma gives a syntactic description of the belief set of a
consequence relation (see [3]).
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Lemma 2.1. If ` is a supraclassical consequence relation, then
A ∈K` iff A∧B ` implies B `, for any proposition B.
A proposition A will be said to be disbelieved in a consequence relation if A ` holds.
This means that the proposition does not belong to any theory of `. Then the above
lemma shows, in effect, that beliefs associated with a consequence relation are uniquely
determined by its set of disbeliefs.
Note. As we will see in more detail later, the representation of epistemic states in terms of
consequence relations can be viewed as a generalization of the AGM paradigm obtained
by replacing its underlying classical consequence relation (together with the associated
selection function) by a supraclassical one. The possibility of such a generalization of the
basic AGM setting was envisaged, for example, by David Makinson in [18].
We introduce below some special kinds of consequence relations that will be useful in
what follows.
Determination
A consequence relation ` will be called determinate if it has a greatest consistent
theory. In this case the belief set K` will coincide with this greatest theory. Determinate
consequence relations correspond to ‘coherent’ epistemic states having a unique greatest
belief state. As we will see, determination is presupposed by the AGM theory as part of its
basic ‘rationality postulates’. The following simple lemma gives a syntactic description of
determination:
Lemma 2.2. A consequence relation is determinate iff it satisfies:
(Determination) If a `, then A`, for some A ∈ a.
As can be easily seen, a proposition is believed in a determinate consequence relation if
and only if it is not disbelieved in it. In other words, we have
Lemma 2.3. If ` is a determinate consequence relation, then
A ∈K` if and only if A 0.
Linearity
A consequence relation ` will be called linear if the set of its theories is linearly ordered
by inclusion. Clearly, any linear consequence relation will already be determinate. The
following lemma gives two useful syntactic characterizations of linearity.
Lemma 2.4.
(1) A consequence relation is linear iff, for any propositions A and B , either A ` B or
B `A.
(2) A supraclassical consequence relation is linear iff a ` B holds only if A ` B , for
some A ∈ a.
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Consequence relations and epistemic entrenchment
Linear consequence relations are intimately connected with epistemic entrenchment
orders from [11]: any linear consequence relation, viewed as a relation among propositions,
will be an epistemic entrenchment relation. Due to this connection, the corresponding
theory of belief change on linear epistemic states will provide a representation of the ‘full’
AGM theory. Note also that determinate consequence relations correspond in this sense
to partial entrenchment relations from [17]. A detailed comparison between supraclassical
consequence relations, on the one hand, and epistemic entrenchment relations and their
generalizations, on the other, is given in [6].
3. Contractions
A contraction of a propositionA from an epistemic state E , denoted by E−A, is defined
in [3] as an operation on epistemic states that consists in removing all admissible belief
states from E that include A. It results in disbelieving A. A syntactic counterpart of this
operation is a contraction operation on consequence relations described below.
Definition 3.1. A contraction of a consequence relation ` with respect to a propositionA,
denoted by `−A, is a least consequence relation including ` and the rule A `.
So, a contraction of a consequence relation with respect to A is obtained, in effect,
by adding the rule A ` to it. The following lemma provides a direct description of the
contracted Tarski consequence relation.
Lemma 3.1. For any proposition B and a finite set a, a `−A B iff either a ` B or a `A.
If A belongs to all theories of ` (that is, if ` A holds), contraction of the latter
with respect to A will produce an inconsistent consequence relation with the set of all
propositions as its only theory. In order to avoid this situation, we will stipulate that if `A
holds, a contraction of ` with respect to A will retain the consequence relation intact. This
‘opportunistic’ policy is implicit in all current approaches to belief change. Accordingly,
this stipulation will facilitate comparison with AGM contractions.
Foundational belief contractions
A contraction of a consequence relation (or an epistemic state) produces a change in its
belief set. Consequently, any consequence relation generates a certain belief contraction
function, namely the function assigning each proposition A the belief set of `−A. In what
follows, we will denote the latter belief set by K` − A. This set can be seen as a result
of contracting the belief set K` with respect to A. Any such belief contraction function
generated by some consequence relation will be called foundational. We will say also that
a foundational belief contraction is determinate (respectively, linear) if it is generated by a
determinate (respectively, linear) consequence relation.
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The following theorem describes foundational contractions directly in terms of the
underlying dependence relation. It is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 2.1 and 3.1
above.
Theorem 3.2. B ∈K` −A if and only if, for any set a, if a,B `A, then a `A.
Thus, B belongs to K` − A if the rule a,B`Aa`A is admissible with respect to `. This
condition can also be formulated as saying that B is independent of A in the sense that any
admissible set of beliefs that does not depend onA can be always extended to an admissible
set that includes B but still does not depend on A. And due to this independence, belief in
B ‘survives’ the deletion of A.
In what follows, we will often assume that the underlying consequence relation is fixed
and denote the corresponding foundational belief contraction simply by K−A.
3.1. Comparing foundational and AGM contractions
To begin with, the following simple result shows that the paradigm shift suggested by
the foundational framework of epistemic states is not as drastic as it may seem.
Lemma 3.3. If ` is a determinate consequence relation, then, for any A, K` − A is an
intersection of all maximal subsets of K` that do not imply A (with respect to `).
The above result shows that foundational belief contraction can be seen as a general-
ization of full meet contraction in the AGM sense (see [1]): in the determinate case the
contracted belief set coincides with the intersection of all its maximal subsets that do not
imply the contracted proposition. The only difference with the full meet AGM contraction
in this respect is that the underlying consequence relation is not classical (as it is in the
AGM), but only supraclassical. This makes full meet contraction nontrivial (and hence
eliminates the need for an additional selection mechanism).
We are going now to compare foundational belief contractions with the AGM
contractions. The following are Gärdenfors’ postulates of contraction. They are formulated
with respect to a fixed belief set K and some underlying classical consequence relation Th.
Th(K÷A)=K÷A (closure) (K-1)
K÷A⊆K (inclusion) (K-2)
If A /∈K, then K÷A=K (vacuity) (K-3)
If A /∈ Th(∅), then A /∈K÷A (success) (K-4)
If Th(A)= Th(B), then K÷A=K÷B (extensionality) (K-5)
K⊆ Th((K÷A)∪ {A}) (recovery) (K-6)
(K÷A)∩ (K÷B)⊆K÷ (A∧B) (conjunction 1) (K-7)
If A /∈K÷ (A∧B), then K÷ (A∧B)⊆K÷A (conjunction 2) (K-8)
To begin with, let us clarify the role of the underlying classical consequence relation
Th in contractions. As can be seen, there are only three AGM postulates that involve Th,
244 A. Bochman / Artificial Intelligence 116 (2000) 237–263
namely (K-1), (K-4) and (K-5). And as is shown in [4] in a more general context, for any
given contraction function, these postulates uniquely determine its associated ‘internal’
logic Th. Moreover, we are going to show that in the case of foundational contractions,
these postulates amount to identifying this internal logic with the classical subrelation Th`
of the underlying Tarski consequence relation.
We will say that a foundational belief contraction function respects a classical
consequence relation Th, if it satisfies (K-1), (K-4) and (K-5) with respect to Th. Then
the following result shows that this can hold if and only if Th coincides with Th`.
Theorem 3.4. A foundational belief contraction function generated by a consequence
relation ` respects a classical consequence relation Th if and only if the latter coincides
with Th`.
Thus, a foundational belief contraction generated by a consequence relation ` satisfies
the postulates (K-1), (K-4) and (K-6) with respect to Th`. Even under this identification,
however, it will satisfy in general only one half of the AGM postulates, namely (K-1),
(K-4), (K-5) and (K-7). The following example demonstrates violation of the rest:
Example 3.1. Let us consider an epistemic state consisting of the following theories:
{Th(p→ q),Th(p ∨ q),Th(p),Th(q)}. This epistemic state is not determinate and, as
is easy to see, KE = Th(p ∨ q). Contracting p from this state will give us a new belief set
Th(q). Thus, both inclusion (K-2) and vacuity (K-3) fail. In addition, contracting q gives
Th(∅) as a belief set, and hence recovery (K-6) also fails. Finally q /∈ K− (p ∧ q), but
K− (p ∧ q)= Th(p ∨ q)*K− q = Th(∅). Therefore, (K-8) fails.
The situation improves, however, if we consider contractions of determinate epistemic
states. Then the corresponding determinate foundational belief contraction will satisfy also
the AGM postulates of inclusion (K-2) and vacuity (K-3). As a result, it will satisfy in this
case all the AGM postulates except recovery (K-6) and the last ‘connectedness’ postulate
(K-8). This means, in particular, that it is a withdrawal function in the sense of Makinson
[18], since it satisfies all the basic AGM postulates except the postulate of recovery.
Unfortunately, the problem of a complete characterization for foundational belief
contraction functions in terms of ‘rationality postulates’ remains still open. Nevertheless,
we will describe below a class of contraction functions that provides a ‘common ground’
for both foundational and AGM contractions. This description will help us in determining
relationships between the two.
3.1.1. Preferential belief contractions
As we said earlier, foundational belief contraction can be seen as a kind of a full meet
contraction, except that it is based on a supraclassical consequence relation. As was shown
in [1], however, full meet contraction with respect to a classical consequence relation is
too ‘poor’ to give a reasonable solution for the belief contraction problem. So, the authors
of [1] suggested to use instead partial meet contraction defined as an intersection of some
selected maximal subtheories of the belief set. In the relational case, such selected theories
are preferred theories with respect to some preference relation on the maximal subtheories.
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In [4,5] a notion of a generalized epistemic state was introduced that can be seen as
a common generalization of the AGM framework and our epistemic states. Generalized
epistemic states were defined as sets of admissible belief states ordered by a preference
relation. It was shown that contractions of such ‘preferential’ epistemic states produce
belief contraction functions that are completely characterized by the following postulates:
Th(K−A)=K−A (K-1)
K=K− f (K-2f)
If A ∈ Th(∅), then K−A=K (K-3f)
If A /∈ Th(∅), then A /∈K−A (K-4)
If Th(A)= Th(B), then K−A=K−B (K-5)
If A ∈K− (A∧B), then A ∈K− (A∧B ∧C) (K-P)
(K−A)∩ (K−B)⊆K− (A∧B) (K-7)
If A ∈K− (A∧B), then K−B ⊆K− (A∧B) (K-7c)
If A ∈K− (A∧B), then K− (A∧B)⊆K−B (K-8c)
We will call such functions preferential belief contractions in what follows. It was
shown also that if the underlying epistemic state is determinate, then the corresponding
determinate preferential contractions can be characterized by adding the AGM postulates
of inclusion (K-2) and vacuity (K-3) (notice that (K-2f) will already be derivable from the
latter).
Practically all the above postulates are known from the literature on belief change. Apart
from the original AGM postulates (K-1), (K-4), (K-5) and (K-7), we have the postulate of
failure (K-3f) introduced in [8], partial antitony (K-P) studied already in [1], as well as two
postulates (K-7c) and (K-8c) introduced by Hans Rott in [21] as ‘contraction counterparts’
of the basic rules for nonmonotonic inference.
As can be seen, the above postulates preserve much of the ‘rationality’ behind AGM
contractions. This may even create an impression that our foundational contraction
functions are a certain generalization of the AGM contractions that do not satisfy recovery.
This is not so, however. It is easy to show that all foundational contractions satisfy also the
following characteristic property:
If B ∈K−A, then K− (A∧B)⊆K−A (persistence) (K-8f)
In fact, there are some reasonable grounds for conjecturing that adding this postulate
to the above list would provide the required complete characterization for foundational
contractions. Anyway, the validity of the persistence postulate is sufficient for establishing
that foundational belief contractions are incomparable with AGM contractions: on the one
hand, the former do not satisfy recovery (K-6) and connectedness (K-8); on the other hand,
persistence (K-8f) does not follow even from the full list of the AGM postulates. Thus,
there are ‘fully rational’ AGM contractions that are not foundational contractions in our
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sense. Moreover, the following result shows that persistence cannot even be added to the
basic AGM postulates, on pain of trivialization:
Theorem 3.5. A contraction function satisfies the basic AGM postulates and persistence
(K-8f) if and only if it is a full meet contraction.
Thus, foundational contractions are also AGM contractions only in the trivial case of full
meet contractions. Consequently, our framework produces an alternative understanding of
belief contractions that is not subsumed by the AGM theory. Still, we will show later that
AGM contractions are representable in our framework via a certain combination of belief
change operations on epistemic states.
3.2. Severe withdrawal
As we have seen, among the supplementary AGM postulates our foundational contrac-
tion functions satisfy (K-7), but not (K-8). It turns out, however, that foundational belief
contractions generated by linear consequence relations satisfy this postulate. Moreover, in
this case our belief contractions will coincide with severe withdrawals suggested recently
by Rott and Pagnucco [23]. A similar notion, called mild contraction has been introduced
by Levi in [16].
As is shown in [23], a characterization of severe withdrawals can be obtained by ac-
cepting the basic AGM postulates, except recovery, and the following two postulates:
If A ∈ Th(∅), then K⊆K−A (failure) (K-3a)
If B /∈K−A, then K−A⊆K−B (linearity) (K-8l)
Note that (K-7) and (K-8) follow from the above postulates.
The following representation result can be easily discerned from the relevant represen-
tation results, proved by Rott and Pagnucco [23], that establish a correspondence between
severe withdrawals and epistemic entrenchment relations (see their Observation 19). Nev-
ertheless, we will supply in Appendix A a relatively short direct proof.
Theorem 3.6. A contraction function is a severe withdrawal iff it is a linear foundational
contraction.
It is interesting to note that both Rott and Pagnucco [23] and Levi [16] give a broadly
coherentist justification for their contractions. The above result shows, however, that a
foundational approach can suggest here a viable and natural alternative to coherentism.
3.3. Revision-equivalence
It was shown in [18] that there is a uniform way of imposing recovery on belief
withdrawal functions: for any such function we can construct a ‘revision-equivalent’
contraction function satisfying all the basic AGM postulates. In this section we will use
this construction for establishing a correspondence between foundational contractions and
a certain interesting class of AGM contractions.
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Two belief contraction functions−1 and−2 will be called revision-equivalent if, for any
A,
Thc(¬A,K−1 A)= Thc(¬A,K−2 A).
As was shown in [18], any equivalence class of withdrawal functions with respect to the
above equivalence contains a unique AGM contraction. In fact, for any withdrawal function
−, its revision-equivalent AGM contraction÷ can be defined as follows:
K÷A = K∩ Thc(¬A,K−A).
In view of the above correspondence, any foundational contraction has a revision-
equivalent AGM contraction. Not all AGM contractions can be obtained in this way,
however, and the following definition gives a description of such contractions.
Definition 3.2. A contraction function will be called a preferential AGM contraction if it
satisfies the AGM postulates (K-1)–(K-7) and Rott’s (K-8c).
Thus, the characterization of preferential AGM contractions is obtained from that for
ordinary AGM contractions by weakening the last AGM postulate (K-8). Now, using the
above definition of AGM contractions in terms of withdrawals, it can be easily checked
that any foundational contraction corresponds in this sense to some preferential AGM
contraction. Moreover, we are going to show that any such AGM contraction is generated
by some foundational contraction.
The following result can be seen as the main result of this section:
Theorem 3.7. Any preferential AGM contraction is revision-equivalent to some determi-
nate foundational contraction.
We will use the above result in the next section in order to give a constructive
representation of preferential AGM contractions in our framework.
Rational AGM contractions
A contraction function satisfying all the AGM postulates will be called a rational AGM
contraction. As was shown in [23], any such contraction is revision-equivalent to a severe
withdrawal and vice versa. Due to our earlier results, this establishes a revision-equivalence
of rational AGM contractions and linear foundational contractions. In fact, in the linear
case AGM contractions, foundational contractions and epistemic entrenchment relations
are interdefinable. A detailed description of the interconnections between these notions in
the linear case is given in [23].
4. Expansions
On the account suggested in [3], there exist a number of plausible ways to expand
epistemic states with new beliefs. In many cases, the differences will influence only iterated
belief changes. Nevertheless, such differences between various kinds of expansions can be
seen as the main varying parameter in our general approach to belief change.
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In this section we will consider an expansion operation on consequence relations that
will be especially suitable for representing AGM belief change operations. Compared with
expansion operations studied in [3], it will produce smaller changes in the underlying
epistemic state, though will generate the same resulting belief set.
To simplify the notation, in this section Th will invariably denote the classical entailment
operator Thc.
4.1. Weak expansions
Weak expansion, introduced below, can be seen as a minimal and most simple expansion
operation on consequence relations. It amounts to adding propositions to all their maximal
theories.
Definition 4.1. Let w be a set of propositions, T a set of all theories of a consequence
relation `, and T m a set of maximal consistent theories of `. Then a weak expansion of
` with respect to w, denoted by `+w , is a consequence relation determined by the set of
theories
T+w = T ∪ {Th(u∪w) | u ∈ T m}.
Thus, a weak expansion of a consequence relation ` with respect to w is produced by
extending the set of its theories with new theories obtained by adding w to the maximal
theories of `. This operation is different from that of a basic expansion, studied in [3], in
that the latter amounts to adding w to all theories of a consequence relation. Nevertheless,
the restriction to maximal theories is still sufficient for producing identical ‘expanded’
belief sets.
As can be easily checked, weak expansion with respect to a finite set of propositions is
equivalent to an expansion with respect to its conjunction. So, finite multiple expansions
are reducible to singular expansions.
As for contractions, expansions of a consequence relation produce corresponding
changes in its belief set. For any consequence relation `, we will denote by K` +w the
set of all propositions believed in `+w , that is K`+w .
K`+A can be seen as a result of expanding the belief set K` withA. Note, however, that
if ¬A belongs to some maximal consistent theory of `, this theory will still be a maximal
consistent theory of `+A. Consequently, in this case A will not belong to the ‘expanded’
belief set K` +A. In particular, if ¬A is believed in `, all the added theories in `+A will
be inconsistent, and hence a weak expansion of ` with respect to A does not produce any
effect in this case.
To exclude the above situations, let us introduce the following definition:
Definition 4.2. A set of propositions w will be said to be admissible for a consequence
relation `, if w is consistent with all theories of `.
As can be easily seen, a proposition A is admissible for a consequence relation ` if and
only if ¬A is disbelieved in ` (that is, if ¬A ` holds). Now, if w is admissible with respect
to `, then K` + w will be an intersection of all maximal theories of the form Th(u,A),
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where u is some maximal theory of `. This means, in particular, that the new belief set
will indeed be a certain expansion of the source belief set, and it will include also A:
Lemma 4.1. If a set of propositions w is admissible for a consequence relation `, then
Th(K` ∪w)⊆K` +w.
However, even in the admissible case the reverse inclusion does not in general hold.
This is because even if u is a maximal consistent theory of `, Th(u ∪ w) is not always a
maximal consistent theory of `+w . A suitable counterexample can be found in [3]; though
given for basic expansions, it will be appropriate also for weak expansions.
Finally, if a consequence relation ` is determinate, and w is admissible for it, then the
expansion of ` with respect to w will amount to adding to ` a new theory Th(K` ∪ w).
In other words, in this case expansion results in a straightforward addition of the new
propositions to the belief set:
Lemma 4.2. If ` is determinate, and w is admissible for `, then `+w is also determinate
and
K` +w = Th(K` ∪w).
Thus, in the determinate case the underlying epistemic state plays no role in determining
the resulting belief set, since it always amounts to a direct addition of new propositions to
the source belief set. In other words, in this case our expansions function as expansions
of belief sets in the sense of Gärdenfors [9]. This fact will give us later the desired
representation of AGM belief revision functions.
4.2. Recovering contractions
If K is a deductively closed set containing a proposition A, and v a maximal theory
included in K that does not contain A, then, as is well known (see [1]), v contains
implicationsA→ B , for all B ∈K. This ‘greedy’ feature of maximal classical subtheories
is a source of the much disputed recovery postulate (K-6) of AGM contraction operations:
if A is first contracted from a belief set and then is added again, then the initial belief set is
‘recovered’.
It has been argued sometimes that the recovery is a feature specific to a coherentist
approach to belief change. Indeed, so far as we are seeking to find maximal coherent
subsets of belief sets that do not imply some proposition, there seems to be nothing
to prevent inclusion of the above ‘recovering implications’ into such subsets. It is true
also that base contractions, as well as our foundational contractions, invalidate recovery.
Still, we will show below that acceptance of the recovery postulate does not necessarily
imply adherence to coherentism. More exactly, we will briefly describe now how it is
possible to ‘rationalize’ this recovery property in our foundational framework using a
certain modification of the contraction operation.
The recovery property does not hold for contraction operations on epistemic states
simply because not all subtheories of a belief set are considered as admissible. As a result,
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contractions are not in general ‘recoverable’: by contracting some proposition A from our
belief set we can delete also some other beliefs (e.g., those that have provided a justification
for the proposition being deleted) that will not be restored even if we immediately add A
again. In many cases such a behavior is reasonable, since the new addition of A may be
justified, for example, by some brand new grounds or evidence, and we do not want to
restore our previous reasons for believing in A. Still, it may be a case that we were simply
wrong in deletingA, and want to restore now our previous belief state. In this case it would
be helpful if the original state were ‘remembered’ in some form in the contracted epistemic
state in order to permit its recovery.
Actually, a quite similar idea was already used by Nebel [20] in the framework of base
change: in order to obtain recovery for a contraction of A from K, the contracted belief
set K− A should be extended to include A→ K, where the latter will denote the set of
implications A→ B , for all B ∈K. The added set of implications assigns the contraction
a feature of remembering the previous belief set; as a result, subsequent addition of A will
restore K in a principal case. Below we will extend this idea to contraction operations on
consequence relations.
Definition 4.3. Let ` be a determinate consequence relation with a belief set K.
A recovering contraction of ` with respect to A is a consequence relation obtained by first
contracting ` with respect to A and then expanding the result with respect to A→K`:
`÷A ≡ `〈−A,+(A→K)〉.
As can be seen, `÷A is obtained from `−A by adding new theories of the form
Th(u ∪ A→ K), for all maximal theories u of ` that do not contain A. Despite this, it
is easy to show that A is still disbelieved in `÷A, so this is indeed a certain contraction
function in our sense. However, expanding`÷A with respect to A will give a belief set that
includes K. Consequently, the recovering contraction validates recovery for belief sets.
Actually, we are going to show now that the recovering contraction provides an adequate
representation for the AGM contraction functions. Thus, the following theorem shows that
any preferential AGM contraction is representable in this way.
Theorem 4.3. A contraction function is a preferential AGM contraction iff it is generated
by a recovering contraction on some determinate consequence relation.
The above result provides, in effect, a foundationalist representation for the whole class
of preferential AGM contractions.
Remark. It is interesting to note that the class of preferential AGM contractions as such
does not acquire a natural semantic characterization in terms of AGM models. Thus, the
most natural candidate, relational selection functions on subsets of the belief set (see [1])
give raise to preferential AGM contractions in our sense, but the latter do not provide a
complete characterization of this class of models; some further conditions need to be added
in order to achieve completeness. Actually, Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1] have
spent much efforts in an attempt to give a complete characterization for such relational
A. Bochman / Artificial Intelligence 116 (2000) 237–263 251
AGM contractions, but the problem has not been resolved. Some deep reasons for this
difficulty are given in [5]. A complete characterization of relational AGM contractions in
the finite case was given by Rott in [22].
As a special case of the above foundational representation of preferential AGM
contractions, the following result provides a similar representation for ‘full’ AGM
contractions:
Corollary 4.4. A belief contraction function is a rational AGM contraction iff it is
generated by a recovering contraction on some linear consequence relation.
Thus, a broad range of AGM contraction functions can be represented in the
foundational framework of epistemic states.
5. Revisions
A well-known principle suggested by Isaac Levi and called Levi identity in [9], identifies
a revision of a belief set with respect to a proposition A with a sequence of changes
consisting of contracting ¬A and subsequent expansion with respect to A. This principle
can be immediately generalized to corresponding operations on epistemic states and
consequence relations.
Definition 5.1. A revision of a consequence relation ` with respect to a proposition A,
denoted by `∗A, is a consequence relation `〈−¬A,+A〉.
Notice that contraction of¬A always produces disbelief in¬A, and henceAwill always
be admissible for `¬A. Moreover,A will always belong to the revised belief set, as desired.
As before, we will denote by K` ∗A the belief set of `∗A. This set will be considered
as a result of revising the belief set K` with respect to A. A detailed description of such
generated belief revision functions will be given below.
Note that even in the determinate case Levi identity for revised consequence relations
does not imply Levi identity for belief set mentioned at the beginning of the section. In
other words, K`∗A is not always equal to Th({A}∪(K`−¬A)). This is due to the fact that
the underlying contraction of ¬A may produce a non-determinate consequence relation,
and in this case the subsequent addition of A may not behave as an AGM expansion on the
intermediate contracted belief set (see [3] for more details).
5.1. Preferential belief revision
As before, revisions of a consequence relation generate a corresponding belief revision
function on its belief set. In this section we will give a description of such generated belief
revision functions.
Given a belief set K and a classical consequence relation Th, the AGM belief revision
functions are characterized by the following postulates (see [9]).
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Th(K ∗A)=K ∗A (closure) (K*1)
A ∈K ∗A (success) (K*2)
K ∗A⊆ Th(K,A) (expansion 1) (K*3)
If ¬A /∈K, then K+A⊆K ∗A (expansion 2) (K*4)
If K ∗A=K⊥, then ¬A ∈ Th(∅) (cons. preserv.) (K*5)
If Th(A)= Th(B), then K ∗A=K ∗B (extensionality) (K*6)
K ∗A∧B ⊆ Th(K ∗A,B) (conjunction 1) (K*7)
If ¬B /∈K ∗A, then (K ∗A)+B ⊆K ∗ (A∧B) (rat. monotony) (K*8)
Let us check first which of the above postulates are valid for our notion of revision.
To simplify the discussion, we will consider in what follows only the case of a consistent
belief set K. Then it turns out that our derived revision function on belief sets satisfies all
the above postulates, except (K*4) and (K*8). Violation of the latter stems already from the
fact that we admit epistemic states that are not determinate. Still, such revision functions
satisfy some weaker versions of these postulates, namely (K*4c) and (K*8c) given in the
next definition:
Definition 5.2. A belief revision function will be called preferential if it satisfies the AGM
postulates (K*1)–(K*3), (K*5)–(K*7) and the following two postulates:
If A ∈K, then K⊆K ∗A (expansion 0) (K*4c)
If B ∈K ∗A, then K ∗A⊆K ∗ (A∧B) (cautious monotony) (K*8c)
It turns out that any preferential belief revision function is generated by some epistemic
state, and hence the above postulates provide a complete characterization for the latter.
Theorem 5.1. A belief revision function on a belief set K with respect to Th is preferential
if and only if it is generated by some consequence relation ` such that Th = Th` and
K=K`.
Due to the above theorem, belief revision functions generated by revisions of epistemic
states can be seen as a generalization of AGM revisions. Moreover, we will show below
that in order to satisfy the rest of the AGM postulates for revision, we need only to restrict
the class of generating consequence relations.
Preferential revision functions constitute a very natural and regular kind of belief
revisions. In particular, we will see later that in the general correspondence between belief
revision and nonmonotonic inference established in [12], such revision functions constitute
an exact counterpart of preferential inference relations from [15]. Unfortunately, just as
for preferential AGM contractions, preferential belief revision functions do not have a
simple characterization in terms of AGM models. Thus, all the postulates of preferential
revision are valid for relational AGM models in which the selection function is based on a
preference relation among subtheories of a belief set. However, these postulates do not give
a complete characterization for revisions in this class of models (see below). At present, a
complete description for the latter is given only for a finite case in [14].
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Our next result shows that adding postulate (K*4) amounts to restricting generating
consequence relations to determinate ones.
Theorem 5.2. A belief revision function satisfies the AGM postulates (K*1)–(K*7) and
(K*8c) iff it is generated by some determinate consequence relation.
Relational revisions
If ` is a determinate consequence relation with a belief set K, then maximal theories
of `∗A are precisely revisions of K with respect to A in the sense of Lindström and
Rabinowicz [17]. In other words, the theory of relational belief revision from [17] is
naturally ‘embeddable’ into our framework of belief revision on determinate consequence
relations. Moreover, our approach shares with [17] an idea that different options arising
in revising belief sets should not be boiled down to a single solution, but must be kept
separately. Further details about the correspondence between the two theories can be found
in [6].
Finally, to satisfy all AGM rationality postulates for revision, we need to restrict further
the class of generating consequence relations. The proof of the following result can be
easily discerned from the corresponding representation result for AGM revisions given in
[12].
Theorem 5.3. A revision function satisfies all the AGM postulates iff it is determined by
some linear consequence relation.
Summing up the above results, it can be said that sufficiently rich AGM belief
revision functions fit nicely into our framework and obtain thereby an alternative,
foundational representation. In other words, AGM theory of revision (more exactly,
the AGM rationality postulates for revision functions) turns out to admit a genuinely
foundationalist interpretation.
5.2. Belief revision and nonmonotonic inference
We establish in this section a connection between preferential revision functions and
nonmonotonic inference relations.
As was argued by Gärdenfors and Makinson in [19], belief revision and nonmonotonic
inference are actually ‘two sides of the same coin’. Thus, any revision function on a fixed
belief set K generates the following nonmonotonic inference relation:
A |∼∗ B iff B ∈K ∗A.
Moving in the other direction, given a nonmonotonic inference relation |∼, there
is a natural way of defining its ‘belief set’, K|∼ as the set of propositions that are
nonmonotonically inferred in |∼ (see [19]; the authors attributed the idea to Hans Rott):
K|∼ = {A | > |∼A}.
In addition, notice that if M is a model of a nonmonotonic inference relation |∼,
then ¬A |∼⊥ expresses the fact that A holds in all states of M. Consequently, such
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propositions can be seen as describing the internal logic of the nonmonotonic inference
relation. Accordingly (and here we depart from the treatment in [12,19]), we can ‘fix’ also
the underlying logic Th|∼ of a nonmonotonic inference relation to be the least classical
Tarski consequence relation containing the set {A | ¬A |∼ ⊥}. Among other convenient
consequences, this choice will provide for the validity of the consistency preservation
postulate (K*5).
Now, for any preferential inference relation |∼, we can define the associated belief
revision function on K|∼ (with respect to Th|∼) as follows:
K|∼ ∗A= {B |A |∼B}.
It was shown in [12] that if a revision function satisfies all Gärdenfors’ postulates, the
associated nonmonotonic inference relation will be rational (see [15]). Our postulates
are weaker, however, and the following result shows that they precisely correspond to
preferential inference relations from [15].
Theorem 5.4.
(1) If a revision function on a (consistent) belief set K is preferential with respect to Th,
then |∼∗ is a preferential inference relation. Moreover, Th= Th|∼∗ and K=K|∼∗ .
(2) If |∼ is a preferential inference relation, then its associated belief revision function
on K|∼ is preferential with respect to Th|∼.
The above result shows, in effect, that preferential inference relations also have a natural
belief-revision counterpart, namely revisions of epistemic states and their associated
belief revision functions. As we already mentioned, the class of preferential revisions
is ‘inconvenient’ for representation in terms of AGM models. The reasons for this can
now be clarified if we notice that relational AGM models exactly correspond to a special
kind of preferential models from [15], namely to injective (or Shoham) models in which
different states are labeled with different worlds. As was established in [15], such models
are insufficient for representing all preferential inference relations.
6. Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper was to clarify relations between the AGM theory of
belief change and foundational theory of epistemic change suggested in [3]. The results of
the study can be summarized as follows.
To begin with, we have described belief change functions generated by operations of
contraction, expansion and revision of epistemic states. The comparison of these functions
with their AGM counterparts has established a number of useful facts. First, we have shown
that foundational belief contractions constitute a different kind of belief contractions,
incompatible with AGM ‘rationality postulates’ on pain of trivialization. It was shown
also that severe withdrawals suggested in [23] (and mild contractions from [16]) coincide
with a special class of foundational contractions generated by linear epistemic states.
Despite the difference between the two kinds of contractions, it has turned out that
foundational contractions are revision-equivalent to a broad and natural class of what
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we called preferential AGM contractions obtained by weakening the last AGM postulate
(K-8). Moreover, we have shown that this class of AGM contractions can actually be
produced in our foundational framework using a certain modification of the contraction
operation on epistemic states, called a recovering contraction.
Finally, we have shown that revisions of epistemic states produce a natural class of
preferential AGM revision functions; moreover, the rest of the AGM postulates can be
satisfied by imposing reasonable restrictions on underlying epistemic states.
Generally speaking, the above results demonstrate that the AGM theory, as reflected in
the ‘rationality postulates’ it sanctions, is not necessarily tied to the coherentist paradigm
and can actually be given a foundationalist interpretation. This shows also that the
framework of epistemic states can subsume the AGM belief change paradigm. In addition,
it was demonstrated in [3] that the rival base change approach is also representable in this
framework using another special class of consequence relations and different belief change
operations. So, the suggested foundational theory of belief change provides, in effect, a
unification of the two principal belief revision paradigms on a (moderately) foundationalist
basis. In addition, it suggests a natural way of extending these approaches to iterated belief
change operations.
Appendix A. Proofs of the main results
In some of the proofs below we use the notion of a semi-classical consequence relation
defined as a supraclassical consequence relation satisfying the following weak form of
reasoning by cases:
(Semi-classicality) a,A∨B `A a,A∨¬B `A
a `A
Semi-classical consequence relations were introduced in [2] for describing non-
monotonic inference relations. They provide also a useful tool in studying belief change.
A semantic characterization of semi-classical consequence relation is based on a certain
feature of its maximal theories. A set u will be called A-saturated if Thc(u,¬A) is a
maximal deductively closed set (a ‘world’). Then it can be shown that a consequence
relation is semi-classical if and only if, for any proposition A, if u is a maximal theory
that does not contain A, then u is A-saturated. In particular, any maximal theory of a semi-
classical consequence relation is a world.
Lemma 2.4.
(1) A consequence relation is linear iff, for any propositions A and B , either A ` B or
B `A.
(2) A supraclassical consequence relation is linear iff a ` B holds only if A ` B , for
some A ∈ a.
Proof. It is easy to check that both the above conditions hold if the set of theories of a
consequence relation is linearly ordered. Now assume that ` is not linear and u and v
are two its incomparable theories. Then there must exist propositions A and B such that
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A ∈ u \ v and B ∈ v \ u. Consequently we have that A 0 B and B 0A. Thus, (1) holds. In
addition, if ` is supraclassical and satisfies the condition in (2) above, then, in particular,
A,B ` A ∧ B implies that either A ` A ∧ B , or B ` A ∧ B , and hence either A ` B or
B `A. By (1), this implies linearity. 2
Theorem 3.4. A foundational belief contraction function generated by a consequence
relation ` respects a classical consequence relation Th if and only if the latter coincides
with Th`.
Proof. Since all theories of ` are closed also with respect to Th`, the associated belief
contraction function clearly satisfies (K-1) and (K-5) with respect to Th`. In addition,
if A /∈ Th`(∅), that is, 0 A, the contraction of A produces a change in ` that results in
disbelieving A. Consequently, A /∈ K` − A. Thus, the corresponding belief contraction
function respects Th`.
Assume now that the belief contraction function respects some consequence relation Th.
Notice that by our stipulation, a contraction of a consequence relation with respect to A
will retain belief in A if and only if `A holds. Now, (K-1) implies that if A ∈ Th(∅), then,
in particular,A ∈K`−A. This is possible only if `A, and henceA ∈ Th`(∅). In addition,
(K-4) gives us that if A /∈ Th(∅), then A ∈ K` − A, and consequently 0 A. Thus, Th and
Th` have the same provable propositions, and this is sufficient for the coincidence of these
two classical consequence relations. 2
Theorem 3.5. A contraction function satisfies the basic AGM postulates and persistence
(K-8f) if and only if it is a full meet contraction.
Proof. If B ∈ K, then A→ B ∈ K÷ A by recovery, and hence K÷ A ∧ B ⊆K÷ A by
persistence. Consequently, a contacting function satisfying the above postulates satisfies
also the following Monotony property:
If B ∈K, then K− (A∧B)⊆K−A. (M)
But as was shown in [1], the latter property, taken together with the basic AGM
postulates, provides an exact characterization for full meet contractions. 2
Theorem 3.6. A contraction function is a severe withdrawal iff it is a linear foundational
contraction.
Proof. Let us define the following consequence relation:
a ` B ≡ B ∈K−B or
∧
a /∈K−B.
To begin with, we will show that this is a linear supraclassical consequence relation.
Supraclassicality (and hence Reflexivity) immediately follows from (K-1). For Mono-
tonicity, it is sufficient to observe that if
∧
a /∈ K − B , then, for any C, ∧(a ∪ {C}) /∈
K−B (again, by (K-1)).
Cut. Assume that a ` B and a,B ` C hold for our consequence relation. A number of
cases should be considered.
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If C ∈ K − C, then we immediately have a ` C, as desired. So, assume C /∈ K − C.
Then a,B ` C implies ∧(a ∪ {B}) /∈ K− C. Now if ∧a /∈ K− C, then we have again
a `C. So, we only have to consider the case when B /∈K−C. Then linearity (K-8l) gives
us K−C ⊆K−B . Consequently, if∧a /∈K−B , then∧a /∈K−C and therefore a ` C.
Otherwise, the validity of a ` B implies B ∈K−B . But then by success (K-4) B ∈ Th(∅)
and consequently B ∈ K− C by (K-1)—a contradiction with our earlier assumption that
B /∈K−C. Therefore, Cut also holds.
Thus, the above definition determines a supraclassical consequence relation. Moreover,
if
∧
a /∈K− B , then closure implies that A /∈K−B , for some A ∈ a. Consequently, this
consequence relation is linear. In addition, inclusion and vacuity imply that K is a maximal
theory.
To conclude the proof, we need to show that B ∈ K− A iff B belongs to all maximal
theories of the consequence relation that do not contain A. Due to linearity, this amounts
to the following condition:
B ∈K−A iff B A or (B ∈K and A ∈ Th(∅)).
Now, the implication from left to right follows from inclusion, while the reverse
implication is an immediate consequence of failure. 2
Theorem 3.7. Any preferential AGM contraction is revision-equivalent to some determi-
nate foundational contraction.
Proof. To begin with, for a given preferential AGM contraction ÷, we will define the
following relation:
A ` B ≡ A→B ∈K÷A∧B.
We are going to show that the above definition determines a supraclassical consequence
relation.
Supraclassicality (and hence Reflexivity) follows immediately from closure (K-1).
Monotonicity. Assume thatA ` B holds, that is,A→ B ∈K÷A∧B . Recall that Partial
Antitony (K-P) is valid for preferential AGM contractions. Consequently, for any C, we
have A→ B ∈ K÷ A ∧ B ∧ C (since A ∧ B is equivalent to A ∧ (A→ B), and hence
(K-P) is applicable), and therefore (A∧C→ B ∈K÷A∧B ∧C by (K-1). But the latter
is equivalent to A∧C ` B . So, Monotonicity holds.
Cut. Assume that A ` B and A∧B ` C hold. Then the first condition implies A→ B ∈
K÷A∧B∧C by Partial Antitony, while the second condition says that (A∧B)→ C also
belongs to K÷A∧B∧C. But K÷A∧B∧C is a deductively closed set, and consequently
it should contain A→ C. Notice also that A∧B ∧ C is equivalent to A∧ C ∧ (A→ B).
Consequently,A→ B ∈K÷A∧B ∧C implies K÷A∧B ∧C ⊆K÷A∧C by (K-8c).
Therefore, A→ C belongs to K÷A∧ C, which is equivalent to A ` C. This shows that
Cut holds.
Thus, ` is a supraclassical consequence relation. In addition, it is easy to check that the
belief set K is a theory of `. Indeed, if A ∈K and A ` B , then A→ B ∈K÷A∧B , and
hence A→B ∈K by Inclusion. Consequently, B ∈K, since K is deductively closed. This
means that K is closed with respect to the rules of `.
258 A. Bochman / Artificial Intelligence 116 (2000) 237–263
The above constructed consequence relation is still not the consequence relation we
seek, since it is not determinate. So, we are going to transform the latter into a determinate
consequence relation. Let us denote by `∗ the consequence relation defined as follows:
A `∗ B ≡ A /∈K or A ` B.
As can be easily checked, `∗ is obtained from ` by restricting the set of its theories
to theories that are included in K. Clearly, `∗ will already be determinate, with K as its
greatest theory. To complete the proof, we are going to show that the foundational belief
contraction – generated by `∗ is revision-equivalent to ÷.
Assume first that B ∈K÷A. We need to show that B ∈K and A ∨ B ∈K− A. Now,
the first condition follows immediately by Inclusion, while the second one amounts to
showing that, for any C, if C ∧ (A∨B) `∗ A, then C `∗ A (see Theorem 3.2 above). So,
let us assume that C ∧ (A ∨ B) `∗ A holds for some C. If C /∈ K, then C `∗ A follows
immediately. So, let us assume that C ∈K and hence C∧ (A∨B) `A, which is equivalent
to (C∧B)→A ∈K÷A∧C. In addition,B ∈K÷A impliesA∨B ∈K÷A, and therefore
A∨B ∈K÷A∧C by Partial Antitony. Combined with the previous condition, this gives
us that both A∨B and (C ∧B)→A belong to K÷A∧C. Therefore C→A should also
belong to K÷A∧C, and hence C `A. Therefore, C `∗ A, as required.
In the other direction, assume that B ∈ K and A ∨ B ∈ K − A. Recall that the latter
condition means that, for any C, if C ∧ (A ∨ B) `∗ A, then C `∗ A. Let us substitute
B → A for C. Then C ∧ (A ∨ B) `∗ A will trivially hold, and consequently either
B→ A /∈K, or B→ A ` A. In the first case we will have A /∈K, and hence B ∈ K÷ A
(since B belongs to K. In the second case we have (B → A)→ A ∈ K ÷ A, which is
equivalent to A∨B ∈K÷A. In addition, since B ∈K, recovery implies A→B ∈K÷A.
Combining these two conditions, we conclude B ∈K÷A. So, – is revision-equivalent to
÷. This concludes the proof. 2
Theorem 4.3. A contraction function is a preferential AGM contraction iff it is generated
by a recovering contraction on some determinate consequence relation.
Proof. To begin with, it is easy to check that the recovering contraction on a determinate
consequence relation generates a contraction function on belief sets satisfying all
the postulates for preferential AGM contractions. Also, it was shown earlier (see
Theorem 3.7) that for any preferential AGM contraction ÷ there exists a revision-
equivalent determinate foundational contraction. The relevant determinate consequence
relation `∗ was constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.7 by restricting the set of theories
of a certain consequence relation ` to theories that are included in its belief set K. For the
present proof, we need to establish a further property of `, namely that it is semi-classical.
Assume that we have both C ∧ (A ∨ B) ` A and C ∧ (A ∨ ¬B) ` A. By definition of
`, these conditions imply, respectively, (C ∧ B)→ A ∈ K ÷ A ∧ C and (C ∧ ¬B)→
A ∈ K ÷ A ∧ C. Now, using closure (K-1), we can combine these conditions to obtain
C→A ∈K÷A∧C, that is, C `A. Thus, ` is a semi-classical consequence relation.
Notice that since `∗ was obtained by restricting the set of theories of ` to theories that
are included in K, for any proposition A, if A ∈K, then maximal theories of ` that do not
contain A will also be maximal such theories in `∗. Since ` is semi-classical, any such
theory u will be A-saturated, that is, Th(u,¬A) will be a maximal deductively closed set.
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Let us denote by TA the set of all theories of the form Th(u,¬A), where u ranges over
maximal theories of `∗−A. Similarly, T KA will denote the set of all theories of the form
K ∩ Th(u,¬A), where, as before, u ranges over maximal theories of `∗−A. Note that any
theory from T KA is equal to Th(u ∪ A→ K). In other words, T KA is precisely the set of
‘new’ theories produced by the recovering contraction of ` with respect to A.
Now, the fact that ÷ is revision-equivalent to a foundational contraction on `∗ can be
reformulated as saying that, for any A, K ÷ A is an intersection of K and all theories
from TA. If A /∈K, then this set obviously coincides with K, a result produced also by the
recovering contraction in this case. So, let as assume that A ∈ K. Our earlier observation
implies then that any theory from TA will be then a maximal deductively closed set.
Moreover, since K is incompatible with theories from TA, all theories in T KA will be
maximal in T KA . Consequently, K÷ A will coincide with the intersection of all theories
from T KA . But the latter is nothing other than the belief set of `÷A, and we are done. 2
Corollary 4.4. A belief contraction function is a rational AGM contraction iff it is
generated by a recovering contraction on some linear consequence relation.
Proof. To begin with, it can be immediately checked that a recovering contraction of
a linear consequence relation validates the last AGM postulate (K-8). So, it produces a
rational AGM contraction function.
Since any rational AGM contraction÷ is revision-equivalent to some linear foundational
contraction −, there must exists a linear consequence relation ` such that, for any A,
K÷A=K∩ Th(K−A,¬A). Since ` is linear, K−A coincides with a unique maximal
theory of ` that does not contain A. Accordingly, the recovering contraction of ` with
respect to A will remove all theories greater than K − A and add a single new theory
Th(K− A,A→ K) which will form the new belief set. But the latter theory is equal to
K ∩ Th(K − A,¬A), and therefore the new belief set will coincide with K ÷ A. This
completes the proof. 2
Theorem 5.1. A belief revision function on a belief set K with respect to Th is preferential
if and only if it is generated by some consequence relation ` such that Th = Th` and
K=K`.
Proof. The direction from right to left was established in the previous lemma. Now, for a
given preferential belief revision function, we define the following consequence relation:
A ` B iff ¬A ∈K ∗ ¬(A∧B).
We are going to show that this is a semi-classical consequence relation. Supraclassicality
is immediate from (K*6).
Monotonicity. If A ` B , then ¬A ∈ K ∗ ¬(A ∧ B). But ¬(A ∧ B) is equivalent to
¬(A∧B ∧C)∧¬(A∧B ∧¬C), so we can apply (K*7) to conclude that ¬A belongs to
Th(K ∗ ¬(A∧B ∧C),¬(A∧B ∧¬C)), which implies, in turn, ¬(A∧C) ∈K ∗ ¬(A∧
B ∧C) by (K*1). But the latter is equivalent to A∧C ` B , so Monotonicity holds.
Cut. Assume that A ` B and A∧B ` C, that is, ¬A ∈K ∗ ¬(A∧ B) and ¬(A∧ B) ∈
K∗¬(A∧B∧C). Applying (K*7) and (K*1) to the first condition, we obtain that¬A∨B
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should belong to K ∗ ¬(A ∧ B ∧ C). Combined with the second condition, this gives us
¬A ∈K∗¬(A∧B∧C) by (K*1). Consequently,¬(A∧C) also belongs to K∗¬(A∧B∧
C). Now we can apply (K*8c) to infer that ¬A belongs to K ∗¬(A∧B ∧C)∧¬(A∧C),
the latter being equal to K∗¬(A∧C) by (K*6). So, we can concludeA `C, and therefore
Cut holds.
Semi-classicality. Assume C, (A ∨ B) ` A and C, (A ∨ ¬B) ` A, that amount,
respectively, to ¬(C ∧ (A∨B)) ∈K ∗ ¬(A∧C) and ¬(C ∧ (A∨¬B)) ∈K ∗ ¬(A∧C).
Applying (K*1), we immediately obtain ¬C ∈K ∗ ¬(A∧C), that is, C `A. Thus, semi-
classicality holds.
So, ` is a semi-classical consequence relation. To complete the proof, we need to show
that it generates our belief revision function, that is, B ∈K ∗A if and only if B is believed
in `∗A. The latter means, in turn, that B belongs to all maximal theories of the form
Thc(u,A), where u ranges over theories of ` that are consistent with A.
Assume first B ∈K∗A, for someA and B . We are going to show thatA→ B belongs to
all maximal theories of ` that are consistent with A. Assume, on the contrary, that u is such
a theory, though it does not contain A→ B . Then u,A→ B ` ¬A, due to maximality of
u. Therefore there must exist C ∈ u such that C,A→B `¬A, that is, ¬(C ∧ (A→ B) ∈
K∗¬(C∧¬A). Due to (K*1), the latter implies, in particular,¬C∨¬B ∈K∗¬(C∧¬A).
Now, applying (K*7) to B ∈K ∗A, we obtain also C→B ∈K ∗ ¬(C ∧¬A). Combining
the last two conditions, we infer ¬C ∈K ∗¬(C ∧¬A), which is equivalent to C `A. But
the latter contradicts the assumption that u is consistent with A. Thus, A→ B belongs
to all maximal theories u that are consistent with A. Consequently, B will belong to all
maximal theories of the form Thc(u,A), and hence B is believed in `∗A.
Assume B /∈K∗A. ThenA∧B /∈K∗A, and hence¬(A∧B) 0¬A. Let u be a maximal
theory of ` containing ¬(A ∧ B) that is consistent with A. Since ` is semi-classical u
should be saturated with respect to ¬A, and hence Th(A,u) is a world. Consequently, it is
a maximal theory of `∗A. In addition, ¬B ∈ Th(A,u), since both A and ¬(A∧B) belong
to it. Therefore, B is not believed in `∗A.
Thus, we have shown that, for any A, K ∗ A coincides with K` ∗ A, and hence `
generates our belief revision function. In addition, since ` is semi-classical, its maximal
theories are worlds, and henceA ∈K` if and only if ¬A `⊥. But the latter is equivalent to
A ∈K ∗ >, so K` coincides with K ∗>. By inclusion and vacuity, the latter set coincides
with K, so K is the belief set of `.
Finally, we have to show that Th coincides with Th`. To this end, it is sufficient to
demonstrate that they contain the same provable propositions. Now, if A ∈ Th(∅), then
A ∈ K ∗ ¬A by (K*1), and hence ⊥ ∈ K ∗ ¬A by (K*2) and (K*1). But the latter is
equivalent to > ` A, and hence A ∈ Th`(∅). In addition, the reverse inclusion amounts
precisely to consistency preservation (K*5). 2
Theorem 5.2. A belief revision function satisfies (K*1)–(K*7) and (K*8c) iff it is
generated by some determinate consequence relation.
Proof. To begin with, it is easy to check that a belief revision function generated by a
determinate consequence relation satisfies (K*4). Moving in the other direction, if a belief
revision function satisfies the above postulates, it is generated by a consequence relation
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` defined in the proof of the preceding theorem. This consequence relation is not, in
general, determinate. So we will construct the required determinate relation by restricting
the theories of ` to theories included in K (as was shown, K is a theory of `). Formally,
we define a new consequence relation `d as follows:
A `d B ≡ A /∈K or A ` B.
Clearly, the above defined consequence relation will already be determinate with K as
its greatest theory. We are going to show that this consequence relation generates precisely
our belief revision function.
Assume first that B ∈ K ∗ A. As in the preceding proof, in order to show that B is
believed in `d∗A, it is sufficient to demonstrate that A→ B belongs to all maximal theories
of `d that are consistent with A. Assuming the contrary, let u be a maximal theory of `d
that is consistent with A, but does not include A→ B . Then u,A→ B `d ¬A, due to
maximality of u. Therefore there must exist C ∈ u such that C,A→ B `d ¬A, that is,
either C ∧ (A→ B) /∈ K, or C,A→ B ` ¬A. As was shown in the preceding proof, the
latter condition implies C ` ¬A, and hence C `d A. Note also that by (K*7) B ∈ K ∗ A
implies A→ B ∈K. Consequently, if C ∧ (A→ B) /∈K, then C /∈K and hence C `d A.
So, in any caseC `d A. But the latter contradicts the assumption that u is consistent withA.
Thus, A→ B belongs to all maximal theories u that are consistent with A. Consequently,
B will belong to all maximal theories of the form Thc(u,A), and hence B is believed in
`d∗A.
Assume now B /∈K ∗A. We will consider two cases. Assume first that ¬A /∈K. Due to
(K*4), K ∗A will coincide in this case with Th(K,A). On the other hand, revision of `d
with respect to A will also amount in this case to expanding its belief set, K, to Th(K,A),
and hence B will not be believed in `d∗A. So, let us consider the case when ¬A ∈K. Then¬(A ∧ B) will also belong to K. In addition, B /∈ K ∗ A implies A ∧ B /∈ K, and hence
¬(A∧B) 0¬A by the definition of `. Therefore¬(A∧B) 0d ¬A, and hence there exists
a theory u of `d containing ¬(A∧B) that is consistent with A. Note that ¬B ∈ Th(A,u).
Consequently, any theory of the form Th(A,v) which is greater than Th(A,u) will also
contain ¬B . So, some of the maximal theories of this form will contain ¬B . Therefore B
is not believed in `d∗A. This completes the proof. 2
Theorem 5.4.
(1) If a revision function on a (consistent) belief set K is preferential with respect to Th,
then |∼∗ is a preferential inference relation. Moreover, Th= Th|∼∗ and K=K|∼∗ .
(2) If |∼ is a preferential inference relation, then its associated belief revision function
on K|∼ is preferential with respect to Th|∼.
Proof. (i) As is shown, in effect, in [19], the above ‘translations’ establish a one-to-one
correspondence between the postulates (K*1), (K*2), (K*6), (K*7) and (K*8c), on the
one hand, and the characteristic postulates of preferential inference relations given in
[15], on the other. More exactly, (K*1) corresponds to And and Right Weakening, (K*2)
corresponds to Reflexivity, (K*6) to Left Logical Equivalence, (K*7) to Or (as is shown
in [19]), and (K*8c) to Cautious Monotony. So, we need only to check the accompanying
identities for belief sets and underlying logics.
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In order to show that Th coincides with Th|∼∗ , it is sufficient to demonstrate that they
contain the same provable propositions. Now, if A ∈ Th(∅), then A ∈ K ∗ ¬A by (K*1),
and hence⊥∈K∗¬A by (K*2) and (K*1). But the latter amounts to ¬A |∼∗ ⊥, and hence
A ∈ Th|∼∗(∅). In addition, the reverse inclusion amounts precisely to (K*5).
Finally, notice that K|∼∗ coincides with K ∗ >. Consequently, (K*3) implies that K
includes K|∼∗ , while (K*4c) gives the reverse inclusion. So, in this case K=K|∼∗ .
(ii) Here we need to check the validity of all the postulates for preferential belief revision
functions. To begin with, (K*2) follows from Reflexivity for |∼, (K*3) and (K*7) are
consequences of Conditionalization (rule S in [15]), (K*4c) and (K*8c) follows from
Cautious Monotony, while (K*5) is an immediate consequence of our definition of Th|∼.
So, it remains only to check postulates (K*1) and (K*6) that are less trivial.
For (K*1). To begin with, K|∼ ∗ A is a deductively closed set by And and Right
Weakening. In addition, if |∼ is a preferential inference relation and ¬B |∼⊥, then A |∼B ,
for any A. Indeed, ¬B |∼⊥ implies ¬B |∼A and ¬B |∼B by Right Weakening, and hence
¬B∧A |∼B by Cautious Monotony. Also, A∧B |∼B by supraclassicality of |∼, and hence
A |∼B by Or and Left Logical Equivalence.
Now if B ∈ Th|∼(∅), then ¬B |∼ ⊥, and hence B ∈ K|∼ ∗ A by the above established
property. Consequently, K|∼ ∗A is always closed with respect to Th|∼, and hence (K*1) is
satisfied.
For (K*6). We need to show that if A↔ B ∈ Th|∼(∅), that is, ¬(A↔ B) |∼ ⊥, then,
for any C, A |∼ C iff B |∼ C. Now, by the property proved above, we have A |∼ A↔ B
and B |∼ A↔ B , and consequently A |∼ B and B |∼ A (by Reflexivity, And and Right
Weakening). Now the desired result follows by the rule Equivalence from [15]. 2
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